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A. Observations About 
                                                       
The Continuing Evolution of Consent 
and Authority in Digital Search and 
Seizure 
Aaron Stanley* 
 
“Privacy is not something that I’m merely entitled to, it’s 
an absolute prerequisite.” 
 —Marlon Brando1 
“[T]here is nothing new in the realization that the Constitu-
tion sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to 
protect the privacy of us all.” 
 —Antonin Scalia2 
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Many thanks are due to the Fordham IPLJ editorial board and staff and the team at Stroz 
Freidberg who brought me into the world of digital forensics.  I greatly appreciate the 
support and assistance of Luke Cats, Manoj Choudhary, and my family.   
1  QuotationsBook—Brando, Marlon Quote, http://quotationsbook.com/quote/32444 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
2  Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Even though very few Americans live alone, most of us keep 
secrets.  The United States Constitution guarantees that, absent a 
probable cause determination, our secrets will remain unseen, un-
e from whom we wish to conceal 
as seen fit to draw a few exceptions 
 
3  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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ult. 
there are substantial difference
                                                       
to the search warrant requirement, and one of those is based on 
consent.4  An individual who wishes to cooperate with the police 
and waive the requirement that officers obtain a warrant before 
executing a search of her apartment is free to do so at her own risk.  
The Court has recognized a number of rationales for this excep-
tion, but also certain caveats.5  This Note explores the law of the 
consent-search exception and some of the technological challenges 
that make its application more diffic
Assume, for the purposes of this Note, that the FBI suspects 
George Costanza is involved in an identity theft ring.  Given that 
identity theft is a crime made much easier by modern technology, 
there is a good chance that George’s computer contains e-mail and 
other information that will confirm the agents’ suspicions.  Surveil-
lance by the FBI has neither provided enough evidence to obtain a 
search warrant for George’s house nor a wiretap.  George lives 
with, and takes care of, his elderly mother in a home that she owns.  
Hoping to catch a break, the agents visit George’s home while he 
is at work and ask his mother whether she would consent to a 
search of the home for evidence of George’s involvement in the 
identity theft ring.  George’s mother allows the agents to look 
around.  In the course of their search, and much to their surprise, 
the agents discover a banker’s box full of printed documents that 
implicate George in the identify theft ring.  The box (which had no 
lid on it, oddly) was sitting on the floor in a closet to which 
George’s mother had unfettered access. 
Provided that the consent was properly obtained and not co-
erced, does such a search violate George’s constitutional rights?  
The scenario seems straightforward, and it is unlikely that George 
would succeed in arguing that the agents unconstitutionally in-
vaded his privacy.  If the hypothetical documents were stored on a 
computer, however, despite the fact that both a computer and a 
banker’s box are essentially storage devices, is there something 
special about the way the documents are stored that changes the 
reasonableness of the search?  Many courts have recognized that 
s between the computer and the box, 
 
4  Mitchell Waldman, AM. JUR. 2D Computers and the Internet § 21 (2008). 
5  See id. 
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would know where not to loo
                                                       
yet the doctrine remains relatively the same for digital and physical 
evidence.6 
In January of 2004, the federal government began investigating 
Ray Andrus.7  As a result of the investigation, and the trial court’s 
denial of his motion to suppress evidence recovered from a com-
puter, Mr. Andrus pled guilty to charges of possession of child 
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).8  Mr. 
Andrus lived with his parents, just like George Costanza above, 
and the evidence was recovered from a computer kept in his bed-
room.9  And also similar to George’s case, it was Mr. Andrus’ fa-
ther who consented to the search of the computer while his son was 
away from the home.10  On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Mr. 
Andrus argued that the search was improper for a number of rea-
sons, but ultimately the court, treating the computer very much like 
a banker’s box, held in favor of the government over a short, but 
intriguing dissent by Judge McKay.11 
Mr. Andrus argued unsuccessfully that, because the computer 
was configured to require each user to logon with a unique pass-
word, the police should not have searched through files that were 
contained on the hard drive under his user profile folder.12  To 
bring this argument somewhat in line with George’s case, suppose 
that George had, instead of storing just loose papers in the banker’s 
box, used manila envelopes to separate his papers from his 
mother’s.  The envelopes are not really secured, since anybody 
with access to the box could easily open each envelope and read 
the paper inside, but George marked the envelopes so his mother 
k.  Likewise, George doesn’t intrude 
 
6  See, e.g., Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing how the Fourth 
Circuit has recognized that computer files should be treated with a high degree of privacy 
protection, but generally looks at computers as physical devices); see also Orin S. Kerr, 
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 538–40 (2005) (dis-
cussing the unique features of the computer hard drive as a file storage mechanism). 
7  United States v. Andrus (Andrus), 438 F.3d 711, 713 (10th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc 
denied, 499 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2007). 
8  Id. at 712. 
9  Id. at 713. 
10  Id. at 712–14. 
11  Id. at 711–25. 
12  Id. at 715–22. 
VOL19_BOOK1_STANLEY 12/3/2008  12:07:44 PM 
2008] DIGITAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE 183 
Part I provides the relevant ba
state of computer technology
                                                       
on his mother’s private storage area.  Admittedly, this analogy is 
weak because it doesn’t encompass the complexities of the security 
features the computer user is capable of implementing, but that is 
part of the reason why computers are in fact different from other 
storage devices. 
And this is where the incredibly significant and terribly diffi-
cult conceptual difference between the physical evidence in 
George’s case and the digital evidence in Mr. Andrus’s case be-
comes a hard legal question.  The specifics of how the files stored 
on the computer differ from those stored in the banker’s box are 
discussed in detail below, but it is important to understand at the 
outset of this discussion that there are no real analogs in the world 
of physical evidence to the ways in which one can protect data on a 
computer. 
Today, computer users generally use passwords to control ac-
cess to data, but fingerprints and other biometric mechanisms are 
slowly being adopted as replacements.  Users and software manu-
facturers have begun to take security more seriously, and users are 
starting to exert more control over their data in an effort to keep 
hackers and identity thieves from hurting them.  Mr. Andrus’s use 
of a password was intended to keep others from accessing his pri-
vate data.  In his case, however, it was as effective as George writ-
ing “Do Not Open: George’s Stuff” on a manila envelope contain-
ing his contraband. 
As the doctrine of consent searching has evolved, so has the 
evidence it seeks to uncover and the technologies used by police to 
find that evidence.  This Note explores the doctrine of consent 
searching as it applies specifically to evidence recovered from a 
computer that is shared among multiple members of a household.13  
ckground information on the current 
 vis-à-vis the two major operating 
 
13  For the purposes of this Note, members of a household could, but need not be re-
lated.  While there may be a slightly different analysis if the co-inhabitants are married, 
those issues are beyond the scope of this Note.  For an overview of how a spousal rela-
tionship may be treated differently, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE COMPUTER CRIME & 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION CRIMINAL DIV., SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND 
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (July 2002), available at 
http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL]. 
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to concerns that many users 
                                                       
systems in wide home use, the software that police use in forensic 
examinations of computer systems, and the scholarship and case 
law relevant to the discussion.  In Part II, the article moves to a 
discussion of the two-pronged debate which surrounds the search-
ing of computer systems pursuant to consent by one of the com-
puter’s users, which was most recently highlighted in United States 
v. Andrus.14  Finally, Part III sets forward a framework within 
which law enforcement agents can simultaneously achieve their 
goals and maintain the privacy protections the Constitution re-
quires. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Observations About the State of Home Computing 
More and more our modern lives require us to own and use 
many different types of technology.  The mobile phones that allow 
teenagers to constantly send text messages to each other in lieu of 
actual conversation are more powerful than the family computers 
of the early 1990s.  Though it may have been forced to endure 
many upgrades, the family computer remains a requirement for 
most.  Microsoft still, as it has for many years, dominates the oper-
ating system market, and most home computers run some version 
of Microsoft’s Windows operating system.15  In recent years, Ap-
ple has secured a larger portion of the market, which means that 
any home computer that might be the target of police investigation 
will more probably than not run Windows or the Mac OS.16  Due 
have expressed over the security of 
 
14  Andrus, 438 F.3d at 722. 
15  OneStat Website Statistics and Website Metrics, http://www.onestat.com/html/ 
aboutus_pressbox46-operating-systems-market-share.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2008). 
16  As of the writing of this Note, the operating system shipped with all new Apple 
computers is called Mac OS X. See, e.g., Apple—Get a Mac—Why a Mac, 
http://www.apple.com/getamac/whymac (last visited Sept. 13, 2008).  Sometimes it is 
referred to as System X (roman numeral ten) because the version of the operating system 
immediately preceding it was System 9. See Posting of Rich Brown to Crave Blog, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-9936378-1.html (May 5, 2008, 2:51 PM PDT); 
see also Wikipedia—Mac OS, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mac_OS (last visited Sept. 
13, 2008). 
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Windows and Mac OS require
                                                       
their computer files, both operating systems have been designed 
from the ground up with security in mind. 
Microsoft Windows XP is the most common operating system 
in use today, and it was designed specifically to be a multi-user 
home computer operating system.17  Microsoft envisioned XP as 
the hub of digital life and the digital family, and as such incorpo-
rated design features that would make multi-user operation sim-
ple.18  The hallmark of multi-user computing is some division of 
computer resources among the users of a computer.  Users of par-
allel-processing supercomputers and mainframes may know that 
resources are normally divided up based on the amount of CPU 
time19 that will be needed to complete a given operation, but the 
home PC environment is structured quite differently.  At home, 
family members generally interact with the computer one at a time, 
and so a simple division of space on the computer’s hard drive suf-
fices to allocate the computer’s resources.  But to access these in-
dividual allocations, Mom, Dad, and each of the kids need to have 
his or her own username.  Both Windows and the Mac OS allow 
multiple usernames on the same computer, and users are required 
to authenticate, normally with a password, in order to access the 
files stored within their allocation on the computer. 
During the initial setup phase of the operating system, which 
happens when the end-user first powers on the computer, both 
s the user to set a password for his or 
 
17  According to a recent survey, many corporate workstations run Windows XP. Gregg 
Keizer, Vista’s Biggest Problem Remains Windows XP, Survey Says, PC WORLD, Nov. 
14, 2007, http://www.pcworld.com/article/139664/article.html.  Home users have been 
reluctant to upgrade to Microsoft Windows Vista from XP, believing that XP is a more 
stable operating system. See Harry McCracken, Windows XP vs. Vista: An Explosion of 
Opinion, PC WORLD, Mar. 20, 2008, http://www.pcworld.com/article/143414/ 
windows_xp_vs_vista_an_explosion_of_opinion.html.  According to a study conducted 
in 2006, Windows XP has a “global usage share of 86.80 [%].” OneStat Website Statis-
tics, supra note 15. 
18  See Jim Hu & Mike Ricciuti, Gates Takes Wrap Off Windows XP, CNET, Oct. 25, 
2001, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-274939.html. 
19  CPU Time is “[t]he amount of time the CPU is actually executing instructions.” 
What is CPU Time?—A Word Definition from the Webopedia Computer Dictionary, 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/CPU_time.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008); see 
also Wikipedia—CPU Time, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CPU_time (last visited Aug. 
25, 2008).  
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educational settings or even at 
tain access to a child’s accoun
                                                       
her account.20  The user may then create as many additional ac-
counts as needed and set a unique password for each of them.  
Even outside of the operating system itself, passwords are a part of 
life for computer users, as most major web sites require users to 
register in order to read articles, buy goods, or simply interact with 
the site. 
There are two main exceptions to the general rule that multiple 
user accounts on today’s common home computers will have user-
assigned passwords.  The first is that some users enable the auto-
logon feature of their operating system, eschewing multiple user 
accounts for one family account.21  Such a configuration means 
that Mom, Dad, and all the kids share access to all Internet book-
marks stored by the web browser, e-mail account profiles in the e-
mail reader, and all settings in the various programs.  When such a 
configuration is chosen, the account will usually be setup to logon 
automatically when the computer starts.  Such configurations are 
much more common, however, with computers operated by single 
users, as opposed to in a multi-user environment.22  One important 
technical question is whether it is possible, and feasible, to identify 
these different configurations before conducting a search of the 
data stored on the computer. 
The second exception where multiple users may share a com-
puter without individual passwords is a situation in which the 
computer’s administrator has configured the accounts such that us-
ers cannot change their passwords.23  This is a common configura-
tion in a corporate environment where multiple employees work 
different shifts at the same stations.  It may also present itself in 
home where a parent wants to main-
t to monitor his or her activity.24 
 
20  This initial account will be a computer administrator and provide “full control of the 
PC . . . .” Windows XP, http://itproxy.org/pcguide/msos/winxp.htm (last visited Oct .28, 
2008). 
21  See, e.g., Mark Kaelin, Set Up an Automatic Logon to Windows XP, TECHREPUBLIC, 
May 4, 2004, http://articles.techrepublic.com.com/5100-1035_11-5280112.html. 
22  See id. 
23  The administrator creates the username and password, thus making the account pri-
vate. Windows XP, supra note 20. 
24  This scenario is analogous to a situation where the unlocked child’s room contains a 
locked dresser, but the parent has a key and unlocks it before the police search through it.  
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maintains a certain amount of metadata that relates to the permis-
sions for each file and folder.29  When an unauthorized user at-
                                                                                                                           
The recommended configuration for a family computer, despite 
the possibility for alternatives, is to configure the computer with 
separate accounts for each family member so that they may main-
tain their independent bookmarks, e-mail, and data.25  One user 
may further expect that if she has a unique password for her ac-
count, the other family members will not be able to access her data 
unless she divulges the password to them.26  The security features 
of the operating system generally prohibit one user from accessing 
another user’s data folders unless that user has explicitly given 
permission to the other.27  Granting other users permission to ac-
cess data is possible with both Windows and the Mac OS, but by 
default each user’s data will be protected from prying eyes. 
In the common multi-user configuration, each user account is 
linked to specific folders on the computer that are used for data 
storage.28  On a Windows PC, these folders can be found in the 
“Documents and Settings” folder, located in the root directory of 
the hard drive.  If one user were to open the main “Documents and 
Settings” folder, she would see folders created for each additional 
user on the system but, unless she had been given special security 
privileges by the folder’s owner, she would not be able to open any 
folder but the one linked to her account.  The operating system 
 
In that regard, the situation mentioned above is outside the technical bounds of this Note; 
however, the investigative principles laid out in the Conclusion, if followed, would effec-
tively discover the configuration and allow the agents to work within the bounds of the 
Constitution while eliminating the possibility of a challenge to their search.  For a discus-
sion of the differences between physical and computer searches, see Kerr supra note 6, at 
538–50.  
25  Tips to Protect Kids Online—Microsoft Security, http://www.microsoft.com/protect/ 
family/guidelines/basics.mspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
26  Users have the option of configuring their accounts as “private” which makes them 
“inaccessible to other users.” Windows XP, supra note 20.  
27  See id. 
28  Id.; see also Wikipedia—User Profile, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_profile 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2008). 
29  Metadata, in this context, means the information which is not a part of the file itself 
but rather is tracked by the operating system for purposes of file management, specifi-
cally security. Chris Taylor, An Introduction to Metadata (July 29, 2003), 
http://www.library.uq.edu.au/iad/ctmeta4.html; see also Wikipedia—Metadata, http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Metadata (last visited Sept. 9, 2008). 
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identified four main differenc
                                                       
tempts to open a document for which she does not have permis-
sion, the operating system interrupts the request and denies the 
user access.  Based on the way the operating system functions to 
protect the user’s data, she may expect that her files are secure and 
will remain private.30 
B. Why Digital Evidence Poses Unique Problems 
In the time before the atom, what we could see with our eyes 
was all there was.  Similarly, when the country was young and the 
universe of searchable data was limited to “papers, and effects,” 
law enforcement agents were able to literally see everything cov-
ered by Fourth Amendment protections.31  As technology has de-
veloped, however, the fundamental building blocks of data have 
changed.  As the discovery of the atom gave way to a whole new 
world of life, the use of bits, bytes, hard drives, and computers has 
provided many challenges for search and seizure law. 
The most interesting, and legally problematic, feature of com-
puter-based evidence is that it can be classified both physically and 
logically.  One can look at the data contained on a computer from 
two very different perspectives, and the choice to treat the evi-
dence one way or the other can lead to very different legal out-
comes.  In his article addressing this dichotomy, Professor Orin 
Kerr examined a number of the different considerations that must 
be addressed before deciding which perspective to adopt.32  On 
one hand, the computer’s hard drive, like the computer itself, is a 
physical piece of equipment.  Despite the fact that the courts rou-
tinely do so, however, analogizing the hard drive to any other piece 
of physical evidence ignores its unique characteristics.33  Kerr 
es between computer evidence and 
 
30  The Mac OS has a similar scheme for organizing data.  For a detailed description of 
how the operating system is organized, see An Introduction to Mac OS X Security for 
Web Developers, http://developer.apple.com/internet/security/securityintro.html (Oct. 28, 
2008). 
31  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
32  Kerr, supra note 6. 
33  See United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc de-
nied, 499 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th 
Cir. 2001). 
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traditional physical evidence: first, searches of computer evidence 
normally occur outside of the place being searched; second, inves-
tigators can create exact duplicates of seized hard drives; third, 
hard drives have immense capacity, well beyond any other physi-
cal device; and fourth, there are procedural technicalities that make 
searching a hard drive far more difficult than searching other 
physical evidence.34 
How the courts equate files to “papers” can mean a world of 
difference in a criminal case.35  Thinking back to the banker’s box 
hypothetical, assume that there were different folders for each vic-
tim in the identity theft ring stored in the box.  Generally, we could 
think of each folder as containing a “file” pertaining to one of the 
victims.  In this case, a file is a compilation of papers stored within 
a container, the folder.36  It is equally valid, however, to think of 
each individual piece of paper as a file stored within the container 
of the folder.  These different conceptions of how to apply the 
word “file” in the physical wolrd are really semantic, but in the 
digital world the name given to a particular block of data can have 
enormous consequences.37  These distinctions are critically impor-
tant in determining whether the scope of one party’s consent has 
been exceeded by the search. 
In judging the reasonableness of a consent search, courts must 
examine the scope of the original consent.  The scope of a search 
of someone’s home “is largely intuitive; it correlates neatly with 
what is hidden and what is exposed.”38  Unlike a physical search 
where once the closet door is opened the banker’s box is visible to 
, where files can have individual se-
 
34  Kerr, supra note 6, at 538–47. 
35  Id. But see Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer 
Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 198 (2005) (argu-
ing that evaluating the legality of searches and seizures of computer evidence need not be 
any different from evaluating the legality of paper searches). 
36  Kerr analogizes folders to zippered pockets within a briefcase. Kerr, supra note 6, at 
555. 
37  See id. at 554 (discussing the differences between the logical and virtual approaches 
to looking at data contained on a hard drive).  By treating the data contained on a hard 
drive as a virtual file cabinet, each individual folder and/or file can have specific security 
properties in addition to the properties set for the entire drive. Id. 
38  Id. 
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evidence that one would exp
scene (e.g., blood, bullets, kni
                                                       
curity settings or be situated such that one user may not normally 
be able to access them, what is exposed in plain view to one user 
may be hidden to every other user.  But there are technologies that 
allow computer technicians to expose certain areas of a hard drive 
where data might normally be invisible to one or a group of us-
ers.39 
In a typical investigation where computers are seized, the evi-
dence may be collected from one location and then transported to 
another for the actual search.40  When law enforcement officers 
conduct a search of a home, they are generally looking for evi-
dence which they can discern as relevant based on physically ob-
servable characteristics.  Because the data stored on a hard drive 
cannot be identified without the use of a computer, the act of 
searching the drive normally does not occur on-site, but at the in-
vestigators’ own laboratory.41 
C. Some Basics of The Forensic Investigation Process42 
The well-equipped computer forensic investigator has many 
tools at her disposal that can be used to dig up information that 
computer users are trying to hide.  Probably the simplest of these 
tools is a disk duplicator or imager.  A trained investigator only 
works off of a copy of an original hard drive.43  Unlike physical 
ect would be collected at a crime 
ves), a properly made copy of a hard 
 
39  There are many software programs that are designed to bypass the user-password 
protection on a computer for purposes of forensic analysis and maintenance.  As noted by 
the court in Andrus, one such program is Guidance Software’s EnCase program, which is 
a computer forensic analysis utility. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 719 (10th 
Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc denied, 499 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2007).  In addition, utilities 
like Technology Pathways’ ProDiscover, AccessData’s Forensic Toolkit, and a free pro-
gram created by Brian Carrier called The Sleuthkit can all be used by a computer user to 
bypass user-level security features. See Forensic Toolkit, http://www.accessdata.com (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2008); Sleuth Kit and Autopsy, http://www.sleuthkit.org (last visited Oct. 
28, 2008); Technology Pathways ProDiscover Computer Forensics, 
http://www.techpathways.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
40  See Kerr, supra note 6, at 551, 557. 
41  See id. 
42  Empirical research in support of this section was conducted by the author with the 
gracious help of Luke Cats, Vice President, Stroz Friedberg. 
43  Kerr, supra note 6, at 557. 
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drive can be relied upon as a complete and accurate representation 
of the original.44  Since these copies are exact replicas of the origi-
nal, investigators can use the copies for their analysis and thus not 
risk damaging the suspect’s hard drive.45  The forensic duplication 
process allows investigators to make an infinite number of lossless 
duplicates.  Unlike a photocopy, there is no degradation in quality 
each time one of the copies is copied.  These copies are generally 
called “images” or “bitstreams” and are created with disk imaging 
software or hardware.46 
Many new computers sold today come with hard drives that 
can store over 320 gigabytes of data.47  Considering that one giga-
byte is approximately equivalent to 1,000 books,48 a single com-
puter could potentially store one percent of the books in the Li-
brary of Congress, far more than could physically be stored in the 
average house.49  With that much data to search through, a typical 
computer forensic investigation can take much more time and be 
far more complex than searching for the equivalent physical evi-
dence.50 
To conduct and manage the search of a computer hard drive, 
 use a software suite specifically de-
 
44  See Equity Analytics, LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331, 334 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting 
that the general process of forensic duplication creates an identical copy of the original). 
45  See id. 
46  See Kerr, supra note 6, at 557; Wikipedia—Disk Image, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Disk_image (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
47  See, e.g., Apple—Mac Pro—Tech Specs, http://www.apple.com/macpro/specs.html 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2008); Gateway Official Site: Shop—Desktops—GT Series, 
http://www.gateway.com/systems/series/529598054.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).   
48  One gigabyte is approximately the equivalent of 300,000 pages of text or approxi-
mately five minutes of high-definition video. See LexisNexis Discovery Servs., How 
Many Pages in a Gigabyte? (2007), http://www.lexisnexis.com/AppliedDiscov-
ery/lawlibrary/whitePapers/ADI_FS_PagesInAGigabyte.pdf; VideoSpace Online, http:// 
www.videospaceonline.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
49  The Library of Congress contains more than 30 million books.  General Informa-
tion—About the Library, http://www.loc.gov/about/generalinfo.html#2007_at_a_glance 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
50  See generally Douglas A. Schmitknecht, Building FBI Computer Forensics Capac-
ity: One Lab at a Time, 1 DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 177, available at http://www. 
rcfl.gov/Downloads/Documents/DigitalInvestigator.pdf; FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
REGIONAL COMPUTER FORENSICS LABORATORY ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007 
34–67 (2007),  http://www.rcfl.gov/downloads/documents/RCFL_Nat_Annual07.pdf.  
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signed for forensic analysis.51  The market leader in this area is 
Guidance Software’s “EnCase” product.52  This software is, at its 
core, a very powerful search engine.  It is designed to allow an in-
vestigator to examine every bit of data stored on a hard drive, in-
cluding data the user may have deleted or otherwise tried to hide.53  
EnCase is able to read the data from an image of the original drive 
and display it in various ways.54  Because there are many ways one 
can hide data on a computer hard drive, one of the most effective 
ways to use EnCase is to create a list of keywords that the software 
will search for, bit-by-bit, across the entirety of the hard drive.55 
When an investigator uses the keyword search function, En-
Case attempts to locate all instances of the specified words wher-
ever they appear on the drive, whether they exist in active files, de-
leted files, or unused space on the drive.  However, there is one 
notable limitation on this process.  The software is generally un-
able to search through encrypted files or data.56  If a user employs 
strong encryption to protect her data, the EnCase program will not 
be able to search anything except the metadata.57  Home users are 
likely to rely on the operating system’s password and account con-
 
51  See Kerr, supra note 6, at 544. 
52 See Guidance Software, EnCase Forensic (2005), http://www.guidancesoftware. 
com/downloads/EnCase_Forensic.pdf; Guidance Software, http://www.encase.com (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2008).   
53  Guidance Software, EnCase Forensic, supra note 52, at 2.   
54  The term “image” is used interchangeably with “copy” or “bitstream.”  For a brief 
overview of the significance of this process, see Kerr, supra note 6, at 557–58. 
55  When used in conjunction with a search warrant, EnCase can be an extremely pow-
erful tool for locating the data for which the investigators have a warrant.  There are lim-
its even to those searches which are beyond the scope of this Note.  For a more detailed 
discussion of the ways search warrants can be exceeded by EnCase, see Kerr, supra note 
6, at 548–57. 
56 Guidance Software, Encase Detail Products Description (2006), http://www. 
guidancesoftware.com/products/ee_index.aspx. 
57  Strong encryption refers to any form of encryption algorithm that is mathematically 
difficult to attack.  Generally, an algorithm which uses a key of greater than 128-bits is 
considered strong. See Encryption Level—Silly Dog 701, http://sillydog.org/netscape/kb/ 
encryption.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008); Wikipedia—Encryption, http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
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trols, rather than special data encryption software, to secure their 
data.58 
EnCase is not just a glorified search engine; it is a full-featured 
forensic analysis suite with an extensive scripting language called 
EnScript.59  One of the scripts included with the program is the 
“Case Processor” script.60  This script, when executed by an inves-
tigator, will extract information about the computer system’s con-
figuration so that the investigator knows crucial details like which 
version of the operating system is installed, the time when the 
computer was last turned off and on, and the number and names of 
the user accounts active on the system.61  The last of these is of 
critical importance.  The Case Processor script provides the inves-
tigator with all of this information in a very short period of time.62  
The current version of EnCase includes additional investigative 
functionality that makes it very easy for an investigator to quickly 
determine what accounts have been created on the computer and 
whether there are passwords configured to protect those ac-
63
 
58  A survey conducted by a user on ubuntuforums.org showed that an overwhelming 
majority of respondents did not feel a need to encrypt their data. Poll: How Many People 
Use Hard Drive Encryption?, http://ubuntuforums.org/showthread.php?t=661517 (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
59  Guidance Software, EnCase Forensic Detailed Product Description (2006), http:// 
www.guidancesoftware.com/downloads/DetailedProductDescription.pdf. 
60  Guidance Software does not provide a public list of the EnScripts that are bundled 
with each version of the EnCase software, but this Note’s author, while researching for 
this Note, used an out-of-the-box installation of EnCase version 6.5.1.2 which included 
the Case Processor EnScript.  Screencaptures of EnCase version 6.5.1.2 are on file with 
this Note’s author. 
61  Based on this Note’s author’s use of the Case Processor EnScript on EnCase version 
6.5.1.2. 
62  A laboratory test of EnCase version 6.5.1.2 (conducted by this Note’s author) 
showed that the Case Processor, executed on a 20 gigabyte Windows partition, takes ap-
proximately 30 seconds to identify and record all of the information.  Screencaptures of 
EnCase version 6.5.1.2 are on file with this Note’s author. 
63  Using EnCase version 6.5.1.2, an investigator can use the “User List” function avail-
able through the “Secure Storage” tab to identify all of the user accounts on the system.  
In addition to listing the users on the system, the “User List” function also displays a hash 
of the account’s password, if there is one.  For accounts that are not password-protected, 
this field is blank in the user list.  Screencaptures of EnCase version 6.5.1.2 are on file 
with this Note’s author. 
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Unlike encrypted data, however, these password-protected 
folders are easily searchable by EnCase.64  Even though the pro-
gram can be used to look at the metadata that tracks which users 
are allowed to access particular files, EnCase is not designed to re-
spect those permissions.  Investigators can use EnCase to search 
through files that are stored in places they would not otherwise be 
able to look.  The software would, in essence, be crippled if it 
couldn’t search through the entire hard drive looking for incrimi-
nating evidence. 
Again, it is difficult to conceive a parallel in the physical world 
to how this software functions, but assume that George’s banker’s 
box is locked somehow.  In fact, it’s more like a safe that looks in-
credibly secure when it’s sitting on the floor, but when the agents 
pick it up they find that the bottom is completely translucent.  They 
are then able to see into the safe, and by shaking it the right way, 
they can expose and inspect each and every piece of paper.  Con-
sider whether such a search would be unconstitutional. 
D. The Evolution of the Consent Search Doctrine 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that all citizens are free from “unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.”65  The amendment also contains the warrant clause, which 
describes certain requirements a search warrant must meet in order 
to pass constitutional review.66  That these requirements were 
spelled out in the text of the amendment led the Supreme Court to 
deem warrantless searches per se unreasonable.67  Over time, a 
number of exceptions have been carved out of the general rule 
against warrantless searches.  One exception to this rule is that a 
search conducted pursuant to an owner’s voluntary consent is not 
68 ted States,69 the Court upheld a war-
nt provided as a condition to obtain 
 
64  Based on this Note’s author’s use of EnCase version 6.5.1.2.  Screencaptures of En-
Case version 6.5.1.2 are on file with this Note’s author. 
65  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
66  Id. 
67  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393–94 (1914). 
68  Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 626–28 (1946). 
69  Zap, 328 U.S. at 626–28. 
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a government contract.70  The landmark case Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte71 held that the non-owner driver of a car could ver-
bally consent to a search of the car and that evidence retrieved 
from the trunk was admissible against him.72 
Further development of the consent search doctrine has come 
from cases where the consenter was not an occupant of the prop-
erty being searched.  In Stoner v. California,73 consent given by a 
hotel clerk did not effectively waive the guest’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights.74  The Stoner Court was not convinced “that the night 
clerk had been authorized by the petitioner to permit the police to 
search the petitioner’s room.”75  The Court was unwilling to allow 
“the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . to be eroded by 
strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doc-
trines of ‘apparent authority.’”76 
At issue in United States v. Matlock77 was whether a consenter 
must have actual ownership of a home in order for her consent to 
be valid.78  The Matlock Court expanded the consent search doc-
trine to include consent given by non-owners who “possess[] 
common authority” over the place to be searched.79  The Court 
made clear that the authority to consent to a search does not stem 
from “the mere property interest” that the consenter may have, but 
instead is based on an assumption of risk that co-inhabitants make 
by virtue of sharing access to the common areas of a home.80 
But the Fourth Circuit was quick to restrict the Matlock con-
sent-search doctrine, and in United States v. Block81 held that a 
ority to consent to a search of her 
ocked footlocker even though she 
 
70  Id. 
71  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
72  Id. at 248. 
73  Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). 
74  Id. at 490. 
75  Id. at 489. 
76  Id. at 488. 
77  United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). 
78  Id. at 166–68. 
79  Id. at 171. 
80  Id. at 171 n.7. 
81  United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978). 
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could consent to a search of his room.82  The court had defined the 
scope of the mother’s consent to include only the areas she had ac-
tual access to, and it was clearly discernable by the agents that she 
had no access to the locker.83  A question still remained, however, 
as to the scope of consent when it is not clear to the agents whether 
the consenter had actual authority over the items to be searched.84 
In the circuit courts, Matlock was interpreted to mean that con-
sent by one co-inhabitant was binding on all co-inhabitants.85  
Post-Matlock, even a co-inhabitant with equal authority over a 
home could not effectively object to a search when another co-
inhabitant had authorized it.86  While this interpretation held for a 
majority of circuits, the Fourth Circuit held in State v. Leach87 that 
Matlock applied only to co-inhabitants who were not present dur-
ing the search, and thus a search conducted pursuant to the consent 
of one co-inhabitant, but without the consent of another present co-
inhabitant, was unconstitutional.88 
1. Matlock Revised: Objections Over Consent 
Most recently, in Georgia v. Randolph,89 the Court took on the 
competing interpretations of Matlock as it pertains to whether a co-
inhabitant’s consent can override another co-inhabitant’s objection 
to a search.90  The Randolph Court held that consent by one co-
invalidated by a present objecting co-
 
82  Id. at 541. 
83  Id. at 540–41. 
84  Jason M. Ferguson, Article and Survey: Randolph v. Georgia: The Beginning of a 
New Era in Third-Party Consent Cases, 31 NOVA L. REV. 605, 612–13 (2007). 
85  See id. at 615–17. 
86  Id. at 615 (“[C]ourts expanded the application of the Matlock standard to provide 
that a person with common authority over property may permit a warrantless search by 
law enforcement even if the defendant has equal authority over the property, is present at 
the time of the search, and specifically objects to the search.”). 
87  State v. Leach, 113 Wash. 2d 735 (Wash. 1989). 
88  Id. at 736 (“At issue is the validity of a warrantless search where consent is obtained 
from a third party who possesses some control over the premises, but the defendant, who 
has superior control, is present at the time the search is conducted. We hold the police 
must obtain the consent of a cohabitant who is present and able to object in order to effect 
a valid warrantless search.”). 
89  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
90  Id. at 108–23. 
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inhabitant.91  The Court took the opportunity presented in 
Randolph to clarify Matlock and what common authority actually 
means.92  While recognizing that common authority is somewhat 
based on a property interest, the Court noted that the reasonable-
ness of a search predicated on the consent of a co-inhabitant is 
rooted in notions of “widely shared social expectations.”93  The 
Randolph Court reasoned that, when co-inhabitants cannot agree 
on whether to consent to a search, the “resolution must come 
through voluntary accommodation, not by appeals to authority.”94  
In reinforcing the right of one co-inhabitant to override another’s 
consent to search, the Court was quick to caveat that the social ex-
pectations test need not be applied to cases of domestic violence or 
other exigent circumstances that would give the police the right to 
enter a home over the consent of one co-inhabitant.95  Thus, in the 
modern era, whether a consent search is unreasonable as to a co-
inhabitant is to be evaluated based on the inhabitants’ social expec-
tations and the law enforcement officer’s reasonable inquiry into 
the validity of the consenter’s access. 
2. Illinois v. Rodriguez—Establishing Apparent Authority 
In Illinois v. Rodriguez,96 the Court clarified Matlock’s other 
open question about a consenter’s authority to allow police access 
to a home.97  The Court expanded on Matlock by holding that po-
lice officers need only use reasonable care in determining whether 
a consenting individual possesses the requisite authority to sanc-
tion a search.98 
iguez “was arrested in his apartment 
nd charged with possession of illegal 
 
91  Id. at 122–23. 
92  Id. at 108–23. 
93  Id. at 111. 
94  Id. at 114. 
95  Id. at 118–19; see also Renee E. Williams, Note, Third Party Consent Searches after 
Georgia v. Randolph: Dueling Approaches to the Dueling Roommates, 87 B.U. L. REV. 
937, 949 (2007). 
96  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 
97  See id. at 179 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14 (1974)) . 
98  Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186; see also Georgetown Univ. Law Center, Warrantless 
Searches and Seizures, 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 38, 78 n.250 (2007). 
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drugs.”99  The officers had been called “to the residence of Doro-
thy Jackson” to respond to an alleged assault perpetrated upon her 
daughter (Gail Fischer) by Mr. Rodriguez.100  Throughout the sub-
sequent police interview, Ms. Fischer led the police to believe that 
she shared an apartment with Mr. Rodriguez.101  Fischer then led 
the police to the apartment and let them in with her key.102  When 
the police entered, they found drug paraphernalia in plain view as 
well as containers of cocaine.103  The police had never sought to 
obtain either a search warrant for Rodriguez’s apartment or an ar-
rest warrant for Rodriguez himself.104 
At trial, Rodriguez argued that Fischer was not a resident of the 
apartment, citing the fact that she had moved out several weeks be-
fore.105  The court agreed, holding that Fischer “was not a ‘usual 
resident’ but rather an ‘infrequent visitor’ at the apartment,” and 
granted his motion to suppress all the evidence collected from the 
apartment.106  The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the trial 
court’s decision and the Supreme Court of Illinois declined to re-
view the case.107 
In its opinion, the Unites States Supreme Court reversed the 
trial court’s decision, holding that the Fourth Amendment is not 
violated when law enforcement agents “reasonably (though erro-
neously) believe that the person who has consented to their entry is 
a resident of the premises . . . .”108  Justice Scalia, writing for the 
Court, balanced the logic of Stoner against Matlock by noting first, 
that the question in cases of apparent authority is not whether an 
urth Amendment rights, but rather 
 
99  Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. (“During this conversation, Fischer several times referred to the apartment on 
South California as ‘our’ apartment, and said that she had clothes and furniture there.  It 
is unclear whether she indicated that she currently lived at the apartment, or only that she 
used to live there.”). 
102  Id. at 180. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
108  Id. at 186. 
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whether those rights were unreasonably violated, and second, that 
law enforcement officers may not assume that an individual pos-
sesses authority over a premises just because she says she does.109  
Instead, the officers’ actions must comport with a more objective, 
reasonable man standard.110 
3. Evaluating Consent: What is The Social Expectations Test? 
The concept of individual privacy rights being established by 
social norms is fundamental to the evaluation of Fourth Amend-
ment cases, though it has by no means defined them.  As the Court 
noted in Rakas v. Illinois,111 an individual’s legitimate expectation 
of privacy “must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, 
either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or 
to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”112  
Justice Harlan specifically noted in Katz v. United States113 that the 
two-fold test for determining whether a particular intrusion offends 
the Fourth Amendment is based first on whether the individual had 
a subjective expectation of privacy, and second whether “society is 
prepared to recognize [it] as ‘reasonable.’”114 
The Randolph majority noted that, in the application of the 
Fourth Amendment to disputes over searches and seizures, “[t]he 
constant element . . . in the consent cases, then, is the great signifi-
cance given to widely shared social expectations . . . .”115  The 
Court posited that if an acquaintance were to show up on your 
doorstep and ask to come in, but your roommate stood in the 
doorway actively protesting, it would be, at the very least, a con-
fusing situation for the acquaintance.116  As a result, “no sensible 
person would go inside,” unless some evidence of a life- or limb-
arent.117  The resulting “customary 
 
109  Id. at 187–88. 
110  Id. at 188–89. 
111  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
112  Id. at 143 n.12. 
113  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
114  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
115  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 103, 111 (2006). 
116  Id. at 113–14. 
117  Id. at 113. 
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social understanding” is that when a co-inhabitant is present, she 
may successfully bar the police from entering a home, but when 
she steps away from the property (provided the police have not co-
erced her absence), her privacy rests in her co-inhabitant’s 
hands.118 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Randolph sharply criticized 
the majority’s application of the social expectations test, as he be-
lieved it was “not a promising foundation on which to ground a 
constitutional rule . . . .”119  Instead, Roberts argued that the Court 
ought to have evaluated this case based on whether Randolph pos-
sessed a “‘legitimate expectation of privacy’” in the shared 
space.120  That expectation, according to Roberts, does not exist for 
a co-inhabitant in a shared space.121  Roberts argued that, while 
one might “trust” her co-inhabitant to not allow the police to 
search a shared space, it is not legitimate for her to expect that the 
trust will not be violated.122  While there may be many social 
norms that people tend to adhere to with regard to shared secrets, 
the Constitution does not recognize them—it merely recognizes 
that privacy interest which protects shared information only “at the 
discretion of the confidant.”123  Seemingly in anticipation of future 
cases dealing with evidence stored on shared computers, Roberts 
specifically opined that, if a computer is shared between two co-
inhabitants, they have ceded their expectations of privacy vis-à-vis 
each other.124  His dissent did not, however, discuss this theory as 
applied to a computer that had been password-protected in the way 
. 
 
118  Id. at 120; see also Williams, supra note 95, at 949. 
119  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 130; see also Williams, supra note 95, at 950. 
120  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 131 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (first emphasis added) (quot-
ing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)). 
121  Id. (“Our common social expectations may well be that the other person will not, in 
turn, share what we have shared with them with another—including the police—but that 
is the risk we take in sharing.”). 
122  Id. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. (“If two roommates share a computer and one keeps pirated software on a shared 
drive, he might assume that his roommate will not inform the government.  But that per-
son has given up his privacy with respect to his roommate by saving the software on their 
shared computer.”). 
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4. Exceeding the Scope of the Consent 
The US Department of Justice maintains a cybercrime website 
that prominently features a manual which was created to aid law 
enforcement officers in conducting investigations that involve digi-
tal evidence and/or computer systems.125  The manual extensively 
catalogues the legal landmines surrounding the acquisition and use 
of computer evidence in criminal matters.126  The first section of 
the manual is devoted to “searching and seizing computers without 
a warrant” and includes an extensive discussion of the rules of 
consent searches as applied to computers.127 
In United States v. Jacobsen,128 the Supreme Court held that a 
third-party’s consent to allow the police to look inside a package 
under the third-party’s control was valid.129  The Jacobsen Court, 
mindful of the difference between the third-party’s search and the 
subsequent government action, clearly established the rule that 
government searches cannot exceed the scope of the initial private 
search.130  Extending this precedent to a computer system, the DOJ 
Manual concludes that if a third-party has access to a computer, 
her consent can reasonably provide the basis for a search of the 
computer.131  One caveat, however, is that under the Jacobsen rule, 
agents must often “inquire into third parties’ rights of access” prior 
to initiating a search.132  A second caveat is that agents must iden-
tify those areas to which the third-party has access and generally 
 scope of common authority.133 
 
125  DOJ MANUAL, supra note 13. 
126  Id.  
127  Id. at pt. (I). 
128  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
129  Id. at 120–21. 
130  Id. at 115–16 (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980)). 
131  DOJ MANUAL, supra note 13, at pt. (I)(C)(1)(b)(i) (“Agents may view what the third 
party may see without violating any reasonable expectation of privacy so long as they 
limit the search to the zone of the consenting third party’s common authority.”) (citation 
omitted); see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119–20. 
132  DOJ MANUAL, supra note 13, at pt. (I)(C)(1)(b)(i).  
133  United States v. Block held “that a mother could consent to a general search of her 
23-year-old son’s room, but could not consent to a search of a locked footlocker found in 
the room.” DOJ MANUAL, supra note 13, at pt. (I)(C)(1)(b)(i) (citing United States v. 
Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978)); see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115. 
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This doctrine was specifically extended by the Fourth Circuit 
to cover computer systems where multiple users have password-
protected accounts.134  In Trulock v. Freeh,135 two people shared 
access to one computer system and, during the course of the inter-
rogation, the police learned that they did not share their account 
passwords.136  The Trulock court held that, because the investigat-
ing agents were aware that the party consenting to the search did 
not have access to the other party’s files, the “consent . . . was in-
sufficient to permit the search of Trulock’s private computer 
files.”137  Rooting their analysis in an application of United States 
v. Block,138 the circuit court determined that, even though the con-
senter in Trulock could legitimately “consent to a general search of 
the computer, her authority did not extend to Trulock’s password-
protected files.”139  The court did not address whether the consent 
would have been invalid had the investigating agents not discov-
ered the password-protection scheme during their interview. 
Another distinction that some defendants have raised is the dif-
ference between data stored on their computer and data stored on 
external media like floppy disks or CD-ROMs.  These defendants 
then challenge searches on both fairness and constitutional 
grounds.140  The courts have been unwilling to suppress external 
media recovered by the police pursuant to warrants that allow for 
the seizure of computer “equipment.”141  As the Tenth Circuit 
noted, there exists “no authority finding that computer disks and 
ers somehow separate from the com-
 
134  Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001). 
135  Id. at 403. 
136  Id. at 398. 
137  Id. at 399. 
138  Block, 590 F.2d 535. 
139  Trulock, 275 F.3d at 403; see also Block, 590 F.2d at 541. 
140  See, e.g., United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
second warrant for co-located computer disks was unnecessary when the police were au-
thorized to search the computer); United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (holding that external media were considered computer “equipment” and 
within the scope of the search warrant); United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746–47 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (a warrant allowing for a seizure of computer equipment was sufficient to al-
low for a seizure of disks). 
141  Simpson, 152 F.3d at 1248. 
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puters themselves . . . .”142  While Simpson was resolved in 1998, 
before Professor Kerr’s article and the line of cases dealing with 
private data on shared computers, there is still generally no distinc-
tion between external media recovered along with a computer and 
the computer itself.143 
E. Exceeding Authorization Through Technology 
In addition to the legal issues surrounding consent searches, 
there are technological concerns that must be addressed in deter-
mining whether the police have exceeded their search authority.  
While they did not specifically address searches of computer sys-
tems, the Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States144 did discuss 
the use of specialized technology in criminal searches.145  In Kyllo, 
the police used thermal imaging to discover “information regarding 
the interior of [Kyllo’s] home.”146  The Court held that use of that 
technology constituted a search despite the fact that the officers 
never physically entered the home.147  The Court’s rationale was 
based in part on the fact that thermal imaging technology was “not 
in general public use,” and in part because the intrusion by the of-
ficers was into Kyllo’s home, a space deserving of the highest level 
of Fourth Amendment protection.148 
The United States had argued that the thermal imager used in 
Kyllo was only able to pick up differences in temperature on the 
outside of the home’s wall.149  The Court found that the imager 
still technically searched inside the home, because “such a me-
chanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment . . . would leave 
 of advancing technology . . . that 
 
142  Id. 
143  See, e.g., United States v. Grimett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1268–69 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“[L]aw enforcement may not expand the scope of a search beyond its original justifica-
tion . . . [and the warrant was to] search any computer media found therein.”). See gener-
ally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.10 (4th ed. 2007). 
144  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
145  Id. at 35–36. 
146  Id. at 35 n.2. 
147  Id. at 35–40. 
148  Id. at 34. 
149  Id. at 35. 
VOL19_BOOK1_STANLEY 12/3/2008  12:07:44 PM 
204 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:179 
protected files.”157 
                                                       
could discern all human activity in the home.”150  That type of “in-
timate information,” even if obtained without an officer ever enter-
ing the home itself, would clearly be considered within the scope 
of Fourth Amendment protection.151  Even though there had been 
no physical intrusion into the home, the police technology invaded 
Kyllo’s protected privacy interest, and thus the Court held that the 
officers had conducted a search.152 
F. Consent Searches and Computer Files—Recent Case Law 
1. Trulock v. Freeh 
In the wake of Randolph, Rodriguez, and Kyllo, numerous 
courts have addressed the questions that arise when the police 
search a computer system using a software program like EnCase.  
In 2001, the Fourth Circuit heard a case which tested the bounda-
ries of law enforcement activities vis-à-vis shared computers.153  In 
Trulock v. Freeh,154 the court heard about how FBI agents, investi-
gating an alleged leak of classified information, questioned the 
plaintiff’s girlfriend, Conrad, about a computer system that was 
shared by both of them.155  During the questioning, the girlfriend 
reported that Trulock had his files stored under a password-
protected user account to which she did not have the password.156  
While the ultimate issue in the case was not whether the search of 
the computer was unlawful, the Trulock court noted that 
“[a]lthough Conrad had authority to consent to a general search of 
the computer, her authority did not extend to Trulock’s password-
 
150  Id. at 35–36. 
151  Id. at 34 (“[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding 
the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘in-
trusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—at least where (as 
here) the technology in question is not in general public use.” (quoting Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961))). 
152  Id. at 34–35, 40. 
153  Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001). 
154  Id. 
155  Id. at 398. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. at 403 (citing United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978)). 
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In determining whether Conrad’s consent extended to Tru-
lock’s protected files, the Fourth Circuit made three interesting 
findings.  First, the court analogized Trulock’s password-protected 
area on the computer to a locked footlocker.158  Second, the court 
found that Trulock’s actions in protecting his files and withholding 
the password from Conrad established a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.159  And finally, the court held that, because the law had 
been unsettled at the time the agents conducted the search and the 
agents could have reasonably believed that Conrad’s consent was 
effective, they were entitled to immunity from the civil action 
against them.160  However, Trulock left the law unsettled on the 
main issue of whether one user of a shared computer could ever 
consent to a search of the other user’s password-protected files.161 
2. United States v. Buckner 
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Buckner,162 tackled this 
issue six years later, upholding the legality of a search under the 
apparent authority doctrine.163  The court sua sponte raised a sepa-
ethodology the police used to search 
 
158  Id. (“Trulock’s password-protected files are analogous to the locked footlocker in-
side the bedroom.”). 
159  Id. (“By using a password, Trulock affirmatively intended to exclude Conrad and 
others from his personal files.  Moreover, because he concealed his password from Con-
rad, it cannot be said that Trulock assumed the risk that Conrad would permit others to 
search his files.  Thus, Trulock had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the password-
protected computer files and Conrad’s authority to consent to the search did not extend to 
them.”). 
160  Id. at 403–04. 
161  Id. at 404 (“[W]e are aware of no reported cases answering whether an individual 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in password-protected files stored in a shared 
computer.  Trulock, though conceding the absence of computer specific caselaw, urges us 
to recognize a clearly established right based upon Block and other similar cases.  We 
decline to do this.  Although cases involving computers are not [sui generis], the law of 
computers is fast evolving, and we are reluctant to recognize a retroactive right based on 
cases involving footlockers and other dissimilar objects.”). 
162  United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 2007). 
163  Id. at 555 (“As long as the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . warrant a 
[person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority, appar-
ent authority to consent exists, and evidence seized or searched pursuant to that consent 
need not be suppressed.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968))). 
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Buckner’s computer.  In a footnote, the court stated that neither 
party argued “that the police officers deliberately used software 
that would avoid discovery of any existing passwords.”164  Since 
the issue was not contended, the court declined to rule on the mer-
its, but noted in another footnote that the apparent authority doc-
trine would not likely extend to a situation where the police inten-
tionally ignored a user’s password protection.165  Such a 
distinction, given the current state of technology, may sit on a very 
fine line, and as such the outcome of Buckner may have been quite 
different had Buckner argued that the technology allowed the po-
lice to bypass his password-protection. 
3. United States v. Andrus 
Most recently, the Tenth Circuit has confronted similar issues 
to those raised by Trulock and Buckner.  In United States v. 
Andrus166 the Tenth Circuit held, consistent with the Fourth Circuit 
opinions, that the apparent authority doctrine provided the basis for 
a search of a computer even when the consenter did not have actual 
authority to consent to the search.167  In a divided decision, the 
Andrus court upheld a search of a computer that was available for 
use by three members of the Andrus family.168  The consenter was 
the defendant’s father and the search occurred when the defendant 
was not home.169  The court relied heavily on the Randolph line of 
cases to establish the validity of the search based on the father’s 
apparent authority.170 
The Andrus court went further into the analysis and looked, 
like the Trulock court did, to analogize the computer to a physical 
e the level of protection to afford it 
 
164  Id. at 553 n.1. 
165  Id. at 555 n.3 (“We do not hold that the officers could rely upon apparent authority 
to search while simultaneously using mirroring or other technology to intentionally avoid 
discovery of password or encryption protection put in place by the user.”). 
166  United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711 (10th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc denied, 499 
F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2007). 
167  Id. at 722. 
168  Id. at 712, 721. 
169  Id. at 713–14.  
170  Id. at 716–17. 
VOL19_BOOK1_STANLEY 12/3/2008  12:07:44 PM 
2008] DIGITAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE 207 
                                                       
under the Fourth Amendment.171  The court found, as courts before 
it had and as Orin Kerr has suggested, that the files stored on the 
computer were analogous to a footlocker or suitcase.172  What the 
Andrus court then struggled with was how to deal with the fact that 
the defendant Andrus’s files were password-protected such that 
Andrus’s father could not normally access them.173  This sticking 
point is the heart of the debate in the Andrus decision and in re-
solving the larger question of how to treat warrantless searches of 
modern computer systems. 
It is worth noting that the Andrus majority did recognize a 
problem in allowing the agents to conduct a search of the computer 
when it became clear that Dr. Andrus did not have actual authority 
to consent to a search of his son’s files.174  At issue in the case, and 
in this Note, is whether law enforcement may, in a similar situation 
with a shared computer, continue to rely on a consenter’s apparent 
authority at all when there are technological options that allow the 
agents to easily exceed the scope of consent.175  If not, then the 
first step in any search of a shared computer system must be to de-
termine the scope of the consenter’s access, and no evidence 
should be analyzed or recovered prior to that determination being 
made. 
II. BRIDGING THE GAP: APPLYING PHYSICAL CONSENT RULES TO 
DIGITAL MEDIA 
When police officers conduct consent searches, they are lim-
ited to looking only at areas they reasonably believe are under the 
control of the consenter.  But, as noted in the three recent cases 
that have dealt with consent searches of computer systems, there 
are two questions that must be answered to determine whether the 
 
171  Id. at 718; see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001). 
172  Andrus, 483 F.3d at 718; see also United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 554 (4th 
Cir. 2007); Trulock, 275 F.3d at 403; United States v. Aaron, 33 F. App’x 180, 184 (6th 
Cir. 2006); Kerr, supra note 6, at 555. 
173  Andrus, 483 F.3d at 718–19, 721. 
174  Id. at 722. 
175  Id. at 724 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
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police action is objectively reasonable.176  The first is whether 
there has been a manifestation of the user’s expectation of pri-
vacy.177  That can be accomplished either overtly by the user en-
crypting or protecting her individual files or, as has been argued, 
could be assumed by the police due to the ubiquity of password 
protected user accounts and the ways that modern operating sys-
tems are configured.  The second question is whether the expecta-
tion exhibited by the user is recognized by society as reasonable.178  
Beyond those two fundamental questions, Kyllo instructs courts to 
inquire whether the tools used by the police in their investigation 
are designed, and employed, to bypass the user account passwords 
that may have been put in place.179 
A. Manifesting an Expectation of Privacy 
1. Judge McKay’s Andrus Dissent 
The problem raised by the majority’s opinion in Andrus, ac-
cording to Judge McKay, is that the court failed to consider that 
the EnCase program used by the agents to search the Andrus com-
puter was designed to find files irrespective of any password pro-
tections implemented at the user account level.180  Two legal issues 
are at the core of this argument: (1) that the user has manifested his 
intent to keep the data private; and (2) whether the technology used 
by the police goes beyond the scope of the authorized search.181  In 
his dissent, Judge McKay argued that EnCase is designed in a way 
that ignores the user-level password protections that many users 
 
176  See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
177  Id. 
178  Id. 
179  See United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 39 n.6 (2001) (noting that the Court can, 
and has in the past, made determinations about what type of activities are “routine”); DOJ 
MANUAL, supra note 13, at pt. (I)(B)(5) (“Use by the government of innovative technol-
ogy not in general public use to obtain information stored on or transmitted through com-
puters or networks may implicate this rule from Kyllo . . . .  although courts have not yet 
defined the standard for determining whether a given technology meets this require-
ment.”). 
180  Andrus, 483 F.3d at 722 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
181  Id. at 723. 
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implement.182  But he tempered his argument with the recognition 
that sometimes the police cannot determine, through the technol-
ogy, whether a consenter has the ability to access another user’s 
files even though the accounts are password-protected.183  Ulti-
mately, Judge McKay argued that the police officers conducting 
this investigation should, at the very least, have inquired into the 
father’s access to the computer prior to gaining his consent and 
conducting their search.184 
The majority, on the other hand, interpreted the apparent au-
thority doctrine as authorizing the police activity because the ma-
jority felt the police had enough evidence that the defendant’s fa-
ther was an authorized user of the computer.185  But an authorized 
user of the computer may not be able to access every file on the 
computer just like a mother may not be able to access her son’s 
locked footlocker.186  The Andrus judges all considered this tech-
nical issue, but could not agree on the proper resolution.187
The Randolph Court was very clear in tying Fourth Amend-
ment protections to an individual’s reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.188  In the computer context, the courts have always been 
willing to protect individual files that a user has password pro-
tected or encrypted, but they have not gone as far as protecting 
data stored in an unprotected form, but in a folder only accessible 
by one user.189  The Andrus court struggled with the issue of how a 
ith regard to those types of files.190  
e at least three different ways of ad-
 
182  Id. 
183  Id. at 723 n.3 (“I recognize that the ability of users to program automatic log-ins and 
the capability of operating systems to ‘memorize’ passwords poses potential problems, 
since these only create the appearance of a restriction without actually blocking access.”). 
184  Id. at 724 (“The burden on law enforcement to identify ownership of the computer 
was minimal.  A simple question or two would have sufficed.”). 
185  Id. at 720–21. 
186  Id. at 717–18; United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978). 
187  Compare Andrus, 483 F.3d at 720, with id. at 724–25 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
188  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006). 
189  See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001); Steven E. Henderson, Nothing 
New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 
56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 530–35 (2005) (arguing against Orin Kerr’s notion that encryp-
tion itself does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
190  See Andrus, 483 F.3d at 718–19. 
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dressing this issue: (1) the police can freely search the computer 
relying on the apparent authority of the consenter so long as the 
computer is located in a common area in the home;191 (2) the po-
lice can be required to inquire about the level of access the con-
senter has before conducting their search;192 and (3) the police can 
use technological measures to determine whether a user has mani-
fested a desire to protect her files.193  The crux of the first part of 
this debate, then, is what steps must users take to clearly manifest 
their intention to keep their data private? 
2. Mandatory Inquiry into Consenter’s Access 
The apparent authority doctrine requires only that a reviewing 
court look to whether the police officers had a reasonable belief 
that the consenter had access to the area they have asked to 
search.194  In a situation where a computer is located in a common 
area in a home and the consenter is a family member who lives in 
the home, the police might reasonably believe that the consenter 
has access to the computer, but a more searching inquiry may be 
required.195  If the police were to ignore information that would 
make a reasonable person believe the consenter lacked actual au-
thority to grant consent the search would be in clear violation of 
the reasonable inquiry rule set forward by Rodriguez.196  The ob-
jective standard by which police action should be judged in cases 
involving consent searches of computer equipment is very hard to 
establish because of the inherent ambiguities pointed out by the 
Andrus majority.197  However, the Court clearly established in 
Rodriguez that it is precisely when the situation is ambiguous that 
re attaches.198 
 
191  See id. at 719. 
192  Id. at 725 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
193  Cf. id. at 723–24 (noting that the agents discovered the password protection after 
they began analyzing the computer with forensic investigation software). 
194  See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990). 
195  See Andrus, 483 F.3d at 725 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 
188). 
196  See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188–89. 
197  See Andrus, 483 F.3d  at 717–22. 
198  Id. at 724–25 (McKay, J., dissenting); see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188. 
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If, as the Andrus majority noted, the use of password-protected 
accounts poses difficulties for police in determining where the 
borders of one user’s consent ought to be drawn, then Judge 
McKay is right, and the police officers should be required to, at the 
very least, ask about the consenter’s level of access to the com-
puter.  Such an inquiry would be a quick and easy way for the po-
lice to discover whether the user had manifested an intent to keep 
her data private.  Of course, the Court’s caveat about lying con-
senters must remain in place if the police are only required to ask 
about the consenter’s level of access, but technology could make 
even that inquiry insufficient.199 
3. Is Password Use Ubiquitous? 
Mr. Andrus argued that the police should have known that the 
shared computer would have multiple password-protected accounts 
on it, but the court noted that the defendant never offered any evi-
dence that would “demonstrate a high incidence of password pro-
tection among home computer users.”200  But Judge McKay ques-
tioned the majority, asking what evidence the defendant could have 
introduced that would constitute “sufficient proof of the prevalence 
of password protection . . . .”201  If the agents were aware that most 
users choose to employ password protection on their computers, 
the Andrus majority noted, then perhaps the agents would have 
been required to inquire about the consenter’s access, but the ma-
jority found no evidence to suggest the police could have reasona-
bly suspected that such protections were enabled.202  The majority 
ignored, however, that the agents investigating Mr. Trulock, ap-
proximately six years prior to the investigation into Mr. Andrus’s 
activities, had asked Conrad about passwords during their ques-
 
199  The Rodriguez Court acknowledged that police could be misled by consenters, pur-
posefully or not, and since the legal inquiry is the objective one of whether a reasonable 
person in the same position would have believed the consenter had authority to allow the 
search, the reviewing court should not hold the police liable for the consenter’s decep-
tion. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186–88. 
200  Andrus, 483 F.3d at 721. 
201  Id. at 723 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
202  Id. at 721–22, 722 n.8. 
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tioning.203  The majority seemed to contradict itself by noting in 
one case that, “[b]ecause intimate information is commonly stored 
on computers, it seems natural that computers should fall into the 
same category as suitcases, footlockers, or other personal items,” 
but then failing to apply that analysis to the agents’ conduct in the 
second case.204  This contradiction occurred because the majority 
considered the computer a self-contained physical device, not a 
data storage system which should be treated as multiple logical de-
vices.205 
B. EnCase, Kyllo, and Unreasonable Searches 
The Andrus court’s analysis of the difficulties inherent in de-
termining whether a user has enabled password protection for his 
account can be exacerbated by the realities of the physical-digital 
distinction.  As stated earlier in this Note, users can enable pass-
words on their accounts and effectively prevent other users of the 
system from accessing their files.206  But those protections are ab-
rogated when someone with physical access to the computer uses a 
program that looks directly at the data on the hard drive and by-
passes the operating system’s security features.  The Buckner 
Court specifically noted, in upholding the search allowed by Buck-
ner’s girlfriend, that if the officers intentionally ignored or used 
techniques that would avoid detecting password protections they 
would not be able to rely on the apparent authority doctrine to jus-
tify the search.207 
While courts have been divided about how strictly to apply the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant particularity requirement to searches 
of computer hard drives, investigators are advised to specify, in the 
 are seeking.208  Should the investi-
 
203  Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 398 (4th Cir. 2001). 
204  Andrus, 483 F.3d at 718. 
205  See Kerr, supra note 6, at 438–40 (discussing the differences between physical 
searches of homes and searches of data on hard drives). 
206  See supra Part I.A. 
207  United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 555 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007). 
208  See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
agents exceeded the scope of a warranted search when they stopped looking for evidence 
of drug-related crimes and began looking for child pornography). But see United States v. 
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gator inadvertently discover evidence of a type not specified in the 
warrant, she should seek additional authority before searching for 
further evidence of that type.209  In addition, a debate exists be-
tween the Fifth and Tenth Circuits as to whether investigators ex-
ceed the scope of consent when they search different areas of a 
hard drive than those they initially asked to see.210  Whether a 
search is improper because of the inherent nature of the tool used 
to conduct it is another inquiry altogether. 
The Kyllo Court was concerned with the application of tech-
nology that allowed the police to do things that the general public 
could not do, essentially looking through a wall.211  To make clear 
how EnCase could be inherently violative of the Fourth Amend-
ment, consider the following two hypotheticals, similar to Kyllo 
and George Costanza’s situation from this Note’s introduction. 
Assume that Kozmo Kramer was growing marijuana in a closet 
in the basement of his home and that his girlfriend, Elaine Benes, 
only entered the basement once a week to do laundry.  Mr. Kramer 
keeps the door to his grow-room locked with a padlock to which 
only he has the key.  He has told his girlfriend that he keeps the 
door locked because there are very valuable family heirlooms in 
there, and he only has one key to the lock, which he keeps in his 
pocket at all times.  Because Mr. Kramer is incredibly careful to 
mask the odor of the marijuana plants, Ms. Benes is totally oblivi-
ous to Mr. Kramer’s illicit activities until one day, when Mr. 
Kramer is not at home, the DEA knocks on the door.  The DEA 
agents inform Ms. Benes that they believe her boyfriend has an il-
 
Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922, 926–28 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding a warranted search where the 
agents found pornography while conducting a search for business records), vacated en 
banc, then reinstated in part, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008). 
209  See United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 530–31 (E.D. Va. 1999) (upholding a 
search where officers obtained a second warrant before searching for child pornography 
when the warrant had been drafted to allow searching for evidence of computer hacking). 
210  Compare Carey, 172 F.3d at 1274, with United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 680 
(5th Cir. 2002) (holding that once a search of a portion of the defendant’s computer has 
been justified, the defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data on the 
computer). But see Kerr, supra note 6, at 576–82 (arguing that a new approach to the 
plain view doctrine is necessary for computer evidence). 
211  See supra Part I.E. 
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look around.  Ms. Benes is shocked to hear that her boyfriend 
would be involved in something like that, and so she gives them 
permission to search the home. 
Obviously, when the agents reach the locked door in the base-
ment, they will see the padlock.  Even if, hypothetically, there was 
no overt sign of a lock, when they tried to open the door the agents 
would find that they could not access the room.  But, and this is 
where Orin Kerr’s distinctions between digital and physical 
searches are extremely relevant, if the police chose to, instead of 
physically searching the house, use a thermal imager to scan for 
rooms with heat signatures matching marijuana grow lights, would 
the discovery of the locked room in the basement violate Mr. 
Kramer’s Fourth Amendment rights? 
On one hand, Ms. Benes consented to a search of the home, 
and the police may have even informed her that they would be us-
ing thermal imaging in the course of that search.  On the other 
hand, however, without the aid of that technology, the police 
would never have been able to obtain access to or discover that 
room, and it is clear that Ms. Benes has no right to consent to a 
search of it.212 
Now imagine that the shared home computer is what the agents 
want to examine.  If Mr. Kramer had encrypted his data and locked 
it away from his girlfriend, any court would likely rule that the 
agents cannot break the lock.213  But if he chose to secure his pri-
vate data by locking the computer with different password-
protected accounts so that his girlfriend could log on to occasion-
ally play solitaire and his secret activities would remain that way, 
ame protections would not apply.214  
 
212  See United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978).  Note, however, that 
if the two were married, the consent that the wife gives to search the house could argua-
bly be extended to allow access to all the rooms, even the ones where the husband has 
forbidden the wife to go. See, e.g., Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 
1948) (noting that even when a spouse is no longer residing in the marital home, “the 
right of [defendant’s wife] to enter the house cannot be seriously questioned . . .”).  Such 
a situation is beyond the scope of this Note. 
213  See United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 717 (10th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc de-
nied, 499 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2007). 
214  See id. at 716. 
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In that situation, the use of EnCase is almost exactly analogous to 
the use of the thermal imager, because the agents conducting the 
search are using software that was specifically designed to search 
through a hard drive without considering the locks put in place at 
the user-account level.215 
Judge McKay’s dissent in Andrus made clear that he thought 
EnCase was a problematic tool in the context of a consent 
search.216  In the subsequent decision where the Tenth Circuit de-
nied rehearing in the case, the court noted that the only valid issue 
raised in the petition for rehearing was whether the defendant’s fa-
ther’s consent was sufficient and the argument “premised on Kyllo 
v. United States . . . was made for the first time in [the] petition for 
rehearing and was . . . therefore forfeited.”217 
III. FORENSIC INVESTIGATORS MUST ATTEMPT TO DISCOVER 
PASSWORD PROTECTED ACCOUNTS PRIOR TO CONDUCTING 
CONSENT SEARCHES 
If, during the course of a forensic investigation on a computer 
hard drive acquired pursuant to a consent search, the investigator 
realizes that there are password protections enabled for one of the 
accounts, the investigator should stop looking at the data and at-
tempt to confirm that the consenter had access to the files before 
continuing the search.218  The process for determining whether ac-
counts are password protected using EnCase is trivial.  Running 
the script that EnCase uses to display the account information takes 
mere seconds of investigator time and can be run after the seizure 
but before any data are exposed.  Since Rodriguez requires that the 
police at least inquire about the authority of the consenter,219 it 
would make sense that if they could definitively ascertain whether 
protection prior to beginning their 
 
215  See id. at 723 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
216  Id. 
217  United States v. Andrus (Andrus II), 499 F.3d 1162, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (denying 
rehearing en banc). 
218  See Andrus, 483 F.3d at 724 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Buck-
ner, 473 F.3d 551, 555 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2007)). 
219  See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188–89 (1990). 
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analysis, they should be required to do so.220  This method does 
not eliminate all of the problems that simple inquiry would have 
(e.g., consenters can still lie about their access rights to the com-
puter), but it does make certain that the police have done all they 
reasonably can do before beginning their search.  It is irrelevant, 
then, whether or not password use is commonplace among users of 
home computers, because the investigator can tell whether the spe-
cific computer about to be analyzed is protected. 
A determination that the computer has some password-
protected accounts does not mean that a search of the computer 
would be unlawful.  It may be the case that the password-protected 
account is shared between multiple users.  It is possible that, as 
Judge McKay pointed out in Andrus, the computer is configured 
with a password-protected account that automatically logs in when 
the computer is powered on.221  Further, the consenter’s account 
may be an administrator account and might be able to access all of 
the data on the hard drive.  In situations where the consenter’s 
level of access cannot be determined by the technology alone, the 
police should conduct an inquiry before continuing the investiga-
tion.  A multi-user computer system presents an inherent ambiguity 
in whether the consenter has access to all of the data on the hard 
drive, and when that ambiguity exists the police must conduct a 
reasonable inquiry to determine what the consenter’s level of ac-
cess is. 
The use of EnCase and software like it poses a very significant 
problem in the context of consent searches.  By its very nature, the 
software ignores certain security features that the computer operat-
ing system provides.  Users who have chosen to protect their data 
from the co-users by enabling password-protected accounts would 
likely expect that their co-users cannot access their data.  They 
possess an expectation of privacy similar to the expectation one 
might have if she kept her valuables in a locked safe.  What many 
users do not know, however, is that cracking that safe is as simple 
t angle.  But it would be a critical er-
 
220  Even if the software provided imperfect results, it would at least provide a basis for 
the investigator to question the scope of the consenter’s access. 
221  See Andrus, 483 F.3d at 723 n.3 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
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ror for a court to hold that a search using technology like EnCase is 
permissible when it specifically bypasses those security features.  
Perhaps users should know that their data are not as secure as they 
might think, but that argument could also be used to legitimize the 
search in Kyllo, since it is conceivable that people are aware that 
thermal imaging technology exists.  Mr. Kyllo could have put his 
grow-lamps in a room built out of material which dissipated the 
heat and made thermal imaging ineffective, but to require that kind 
of manifestation of an expectation of privacy goes well beyond the 
constitutional protections from unreasonable searches.  The courts 
should not sanction the use of technologies that evade reasonable 
security protections no matter how weak they are. 
A. The Future 
Heavy computer users know that even the largest internal hard 
drive can quickly be filled with data.  Users have been copying 
their data to external storage devices for decades as a means of 
preserving their data.222  Now, however, zip disks are slow and ex-
pensive, so users are saving their back-up data on external hard 
drives.223  One of the technologies to recently jump from the office 
to the home computing environment is the network hard drive.224  
These are standalone data storage devices which are accessed via a 
user’s home network.225  Users of these network drives can choose 
to configure multiple user accounts just like they can on their com-
puters.226 
 
222  There are many ways a computer user can backup her data.  Users generally copy 
data to an external disk which, in the past, would have been a floppy disk. See IBM Ar-
chives: 20th Century Disk Storage Chronology, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ 
exhibits/storage/storage_chrono20.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008); Wikipedia—Floppy 
Disk, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Floppy_disk (last visited Aug. 25, 2008) (historical 
perspective on the development of the external disk dating back to the 1970s). 
223 See, e.g., Maxtor OneTouch 4 Plus, http://www.maxtor.com/en/external-drives/ 
external-hard-drive/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
224  See Western Digital—My Book World Edition 1 TB Hard Drives, http://www. 
wdc.com/en/products/Products.asp?DriveID=347 (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
225  Id. 
226 WESTERN DIGITAL, MY BOOK WORLD EDITION USER MANUAL 35–38 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.wdc.com/en/library/usb/2779-701026.pdf. 
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Unlike a stand-alone computer, however, the forensic technol-
ogy may not be able to easily discover whether there are passwords 
in place which restrict access to certain files.  As well, a co-
inhabitant may not be aware that another co-inhabitant has in-
stalled such a device on the network.  The issue that courts may 
soon need to resolve is whether to treat these hard drives like other 
external media (e.g., CD-ROMs, Zip Disks, etc.), or computers 
themselves. 
By treating these network drives like other external media, the 
court would sanction police seizure and search of the data on them, 
just as in Andrus, and the only way a user could protect herself 
from such a search would be to password-protect or encrypt the in-
dividual files.  To require encryption in the case of a storage 
mechanism that is password-protected, based on the inquiry re-
quirement imposed in Trulock,227 would be an unreasonable bur-
den on users. 
As storage devices become more sophisticated and integrate 
certain functions normally reserved only to stand-alone computers, 
the line between what is external media and what is a computer 
will continue to be blurred.  Certainly, courts should approach 
these new technologies just as they approach any new technology: 
by applying the rules of law from the most analogous situations to 
the new one the court faces.228  As the courts encounter these new 
storage technologies that allow users to secure their data from 
other users of the same device, they should construe the restric-
tions on law enforcement activity as narrowly as possible in order 
to protect an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.229 
 
 
227  See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402–03 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Stoner v. Cali-
fornia, 376 U.S. 483 (1964)). 
228  See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
229  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has emerged 
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhib-
ited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
